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Assuming that there is no other solution than herd immunity in 
front of the current pandemic, on which categories of citizens should 
we build this herd immunity? Given the fact that young people face a 
mortality rate which is at least a thousand times smaller than people 
aged 70 years and more, there is a simple rational to build it on these 
younger generations. The transfer of some mortality risk to younger 
people raises difficult ethical issues. However, none of the familiar 
moral or operational guidelines (equality of rights, VSL, QALY, ...) 
that have been used in the Western world over the last century weights 
the value of young lives 1000 times or more than the lives of the elders. 
This suggests that Society could offer covid protection to the elders by 
confining them as long as this herd immunity has not been attained 
by the younger generations. This would be a potent demonstration of 
intergenerational solidarity towards the most vulnerable people in 
our community. The welfare gain of this age-specific deconfinement 
strategy is huge, as it can reduce the global death toll by more 
than 80%.
1 I thank Ingela Alger, Jim Hammitt, Ulrich Hege, Paul Seabright and Nicolas Treich for helpful comments. The 
research leading to these results has received the support from the ANR Grant Covid-Metrics.
2 Managing Director, Toulouse School of Economics, Professor of Economics, University of Toulouse-Capitole 
and CEPR Research Fellow.
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1 Introduction
How should we win the war against the covid pandemic? In the absence of
a treatment or a vaccine, there exists only two options. The first option is a
long confinement of a large fraction of the population that would maintain
the reproduction number R below unity for a very long period of time to
obliterate the virus. The economic cost of this suppression strategy is now
considered as unbearable in many countries. The other option is to pro-
gressively build the herd immunity by gradually exposing the population to
the virus. Under this scenario, the containment is weakened to allow R to
grow above 1, but not to far away from it to escape the risk of overwhelming
hospitals. Whether this is obtained through fine tuning the intensity of the
confinement in real time (Alvarez, Argente and Lippi, 2020) or through a
stop-and-go policy remains to be decided.
In this paper, I suppose that herd immunity is the exit door from the
pandemic. In the absence of a vaccine, attaining herd immunity requires
to expose a fraction of the population to the virus, and to recognize that
some people in this targeted population will die. Determining who should
be exposed to the virus to attain the herd immunity is a crucial policy issue.
Which criteria should be used to perform this task? Should we leave nature
do its dismal work at random until the natural immunity be obtained, or
should we protect some specific communities from this danger? Two issues,
one on efficiency and the other on ethics, are at stake here. Consider first
the now well-documented fact that some categories of people are more likely
than others to die if exposed to the virus. Some individual characteristics
such as the age or the existence of co-morbidity have been shown to have a
huge influence on the lethality of the SARS-Cov-2. For example, Ferguson
et al. (2020) report that the covid infection-fatality ratio is 0.002% for
individuals less than 10 years old, and 9.3% for people aged 80 years and
more. Given this 4650-fold difference in mortality risk, it may be desirable to
expose less vulnerable people first in the hope of building the herd immunity
before relaxing the protection of the more vulnerable people.
A few recent papers have supported a age-targeted deconfinement strat-
egy. Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, Werning and Whinston (2020) characterize
two intertemporally optimal exit strategies from lockdown, one in which the
policy is constrained to be uniform across age classes, and the other in which
different age classes can be treated in a discriminated way. They claim that
2.7 million lives could be saved in the United States by maintaining a stricter
confinement for the seniors. Favero, Ichino and Rustichini (2020) compare
different age-specific policies for Italy and come to the same conclusion of the
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overwhelming dominance of confining elderly people longer. Brotherhood,
Kircher, Santos and Tertilt (2020) explore the impact of various confinement
policies on the incentive of different age classes to behave efficiently.
Transferring some mortality risk across individuals raises complex moral
issues. And discriminating the right to a safe life also raises constitutional
concerns. The equality of rights, for example the equal right to the protec-
tion from a virus, is a dominant mode of Western ethical principles. The
American Declaration of Independence holds the notion that ”all men are
created equal” to be self-evident. The French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen states that ”les hommes naissent et demeurent li-
bres et e´gaux en droit”. And the WHO Constitution (1946) envisages ”the
highest attainable standard of health as a fundamental right of every hu-
man being.” But in practice, the right to a safe life has always been vastly
discriminated in the Free World. Some people are more exposed to deadly
pollutants than others. The access to efficient health services is very het-
erogeneous across different localities within the same country. Rather than
considering health protection as a basic human right, the practice of public
decision-making has been to allow for tradeoffs between individual health
and collective wealth. Standard guidelines for public benefit-cost analysis
most often require to use a specific system of values to account for the im-
pact of public policies on mortality risks. This value system has routinely
discriminated against specific individual characteristics such as age and mor-
bidity. Thus, transferring some mortality risk to less vulnerable people may
not be socially desirable if Society values the lives of these less vulnerable
people more. This may be the case for example if vulnerability is posi-
tively correlated with age, because preserving the life of a young person is
commonly considered as more valuable than preserving the life of an older
person. In this paper, I use the existing statistics of covid mortality rates
for different age classes to determine the optimal targeted deconfinement
for the most common ethical attitudes towards the preservation of different
lives.
I don’t have a solution to break this moral dilemma in the general con-
text. My aim in this paper is to quantify the consequences of different social
norms used in the current context, as measured by the number of people
who are expected to die, or by the number of life years lost. It is sad that
democracies have rarely organized a public debate about how tradeoffs be-
tween health and wealth should be made at the collective level. The absence
of democratic legitimacy attached to the competing value systems to per-
form this task creates a vacuum for decision-makers. The good news from
my analysis is that all familiar value systems lead to the same conclusion in
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the context of the covid pandemic.
2 The model
The population is composed of I individuals. Individual i ∈ {1, ..., I} has
a probability pi of dying conditional to being infected. Society associates
a value vi to changes in the survival probability of that individual.
1 Let
xi take value 1 if individual i is exposed to the virus and 0 if that indi-
vidual is preserved from this exposure. Let π denote the proportion of the
population that must be exposed to the virus. I characterize the strategy
X = {x1, ..., xI} that minimizes the aggregate value of lives lost under the
constraint of attaining the proportion π of exposure to the virus:2
min
{x1,...,xI}∈{0,1}I
I∑
i=1
xipivi s.t.
I∑
i=1
xi ≥ πI. (1)
Let me reinterpret this program in the context of the current covid pan-
demic. A first group of individuals is selected to be deconfined with the
smallest restrictions in terms of social distancing in order to preserve the
capacity of ICUs in the country. Let this subpopulation create their own
herd immunity. The proportion of immunized individuals in this subpopu-
lation is large because of the importance of social interactions in this first
period. During this period, the second group of individuals is protected from
physical contacts with the first group. Once the herd immunity is obtained
in the first group, the second group is deconfined and some light social dis-
tancing rules are established to make sure that the proportion of immunized
people in the whole population is larger than the new herd immunity pro-
portion given these light restrictions.3 An illustration of this dynamic policy
is described by Favero, Ichino and Rustichini (2020) and Gollier (2020) for
example. This dynamics may be complex, and this complexity may hide
the crucial moral and economic issues behind the recommendations that
can be extracted from its type of analysis. The bottom line of any indi-
vidual characteristic-specific deconfinement strategy is that some classes of
1In the different policies that I consider, the changes in mortality risk faced by different
age classes remain moderate, so that vi can be interpreted as the Value of Statistical Life
(VSL), a concept that values marginal changes in the probability to die.
2In other words, I adopt a cost-efficiency approach. Contrary to the cost-benefit ap-
proach, I don’t arbitrage here between health and wealth.
3Pindyck (2020) characterizes the relationship between the herd immunity proportion
and the social distancing proportion.
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Age Population Infection fatality
class size proportion (pi)
0-19 16,084,743 0.001%
20-29 7,470,908 0.007%
30-39 8,288,257 0.02%
40-49 8,584,449 0.05%
50-59 8,785,106 0.2%
60-69 7,999,606 0.8%
70-79 5,693,660 2.2%
80+ 4,156,974 8.3%
Table 1: Estimation of the IFP by age class in France. Source: Saltje et al. (2020) and
INSEE.
individuals will contribute more than others to build the herd immunity.
Program (1) describes in its simplest form the key issues behind the politi-
cal choice of deconfinement. Remember that refusing any discrimination in
the deconfinement strategy is a decision in itself.
The solution of program (1) is trivial. The decision-maker must select a
threshold λ such that all individuals i with a score pivi smaller than λ are
exposed and all the other are protected. The threshold λ is selected so that
this decision rule leads to having a proportion π of the population being
exposed.
In this paper, I focus on age-specific deconfinement strategies.4 This is
because age is a key individual characteristic that affects at the same time
the lethality of the virus and the societal value of lives saved. In the case of
France, Salje et al. (2020) from Institut Pasteur have estimated the Infection
Fatality Proportion (IFP) by age, using French data available in mid April.
This estimation of the pi is documented in Table 1. In France, 80% of the
covid dead toll targeted individuals aged 66 years or older. Ferguson et al.
(2020) documents age-differences of the IFP estimations exhibiting the same
order of magnitude, using international data available in mid March.
I also assume that the post-pandemic herd immunity proportion is π =
80%. In reality, this proportion remains uncertain, and is sensitive to the
intensity of social interactions.
4Other risk factors such as obesity, diabetes and gender also matter. I prefer to focus
on age, as it is probably less controversial. See my discussion in Section 4.
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3 Efficient age-specific deconfinement strategies
3.1 Equality
In most countries, the evolution of the pandemic is measured by the cumu-
lated number of individuals who died from the virus. This is how politicians,
the media and the citizens follows the evolution of the pandemic. This sug-
gests a normative approach in which mortality risk is valued independent
of the age of the victims: vi = 1 for all i ∈ {1, ..., I}. It translates the
ethical/constitutional concept of the equality into a value system.
Many life-saving regulations affect mortality risks across a wide popu-
lation and result in a small change in risk at the individual level. Public
administrations routinely evaluate the net social benefit of these policies.
In France, the Quinet Report (Quinet, 2013) argues in favor of valuing
changes in mortality risk independent of age to evaluate public policies and
investments. In the United States, the Office of Management and Budget
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have been recommending
and using an age-independent life valuation approach over many decades
(US-EPA, 2010): ”The committee concluded that the existing economics
literature does not provide clear theoretical or empirical support for using
different values for mortality risk reductions for differently-aged adults”. As
explained by Robinson (2007) and Viscusi (2009), this decision has been very
controversial. In 2008, the EPA produced a report evaluating the Clear Skies
initiative, it used a constant value of statistical life, but it also examined an
alternative measure of the policy containing a 37% discount VSL for people
aged over 65. Elderly citizen groups launched a series of public protests
against what has come to be known as the ”senior discount” or the ”senior
death discount”. Since then, the EPA has abandoned the age-adjustment of
the VSL.
When comparing different exit strategies of the current pandemic, Favero,
Ichino and Rustichini (2020) also value lives lost without differentiating vic-
tims by age. Notice that I do not monetize lives in this paper. Choosing a
vi = v of 3 million or 10 million euros is irrelevant for the analysis.
Using Table 1, the equality score pivi = piv is increasing with age. Under
this familiar ethical norm, the efficient strategy consists in determining a age
threshold A such as all individuals aged less than A are deconfined, whereas
all those aged more than A remain confined until herd immunity is obtained.
Because 20% of the population is older than 65 years, this means that the
deconfinement should be limited to people less than 65 years old.
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3.2 Quality-adjusted life expectancy
A more recent tradition in health economics is to value each year of life
lost adjusted for its health quality. It combines individual information on
mortality and morbidity. As one grows older, life expectation goes down and
morbidity goes up, implying a decreasing relationship between the Quality-
Adjusted Life Expectation (QALE) and age in the population. It is an
aggregate version of the quality-adjusted life year (QALY). This relation
between QALE and age has been measured by Love-Koh et al. (2015) for
the United Kingdom, and is documented in Table 2.
Suppose that the social planner considers that QALE is the morally
acceptable way to value lives lost in the face of the covid crisis, i.e., vi =
QALEi for all age classes i. Under this assumption, the social planner will
for example value the life of a 20-29 years old person 4.5 times more than the
life of a 70-79 years old person. Compared to the equality-of-rights criterion,
the QALE criterion puts more weight to the survival of young people. It has
thus the potential to reverse the recommendation to expose young people
first. This would be the case if the growth rate of the mortality rate with
age is smaller than the reduction rate of QALE with age. As shown in the
last column of Table 2, this is not the case since the QALE score is an
increasing function of age. The QALE and equality criteria generate the
same recommendation to limit the exposure people younger than 65 years
old to the virus.
Because the quality-adjustment contained in the QALE measures favors
younger people, there is no doubt that a non-quality-adjusted life expectancy
criterion, such as the Value of statistical Life Year (VSLY), will generate the
same recommendation to deconfine younger generations first.
3.3 Revealed preference
Economists have long pursued the goal of measuring how people value their
own mortality risk. This has been made possible by the development of the
concept of the Value of Statistical Life (VSL), by Dre`ze (1962), Schelling
(1968) and Jones-Lee (1974). A large literature has been built over the last
half century to measure how mortality differentials affects wages and real
estate prices for example. Some RP studies estimate willingness to pay from
market prices for products (such as airbags) that reduce the likelihood of a
fatal injury. This yields estimates of the Revealed Preference (RP) valuation
of statistical lives. A subset of these studies has documented the fact that
these estimates are sensitive to the age of the person facing the mortality
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Age class QALE value (vi) QALE score (pivi)
0-19 63.0 0.1
20-29 49.5 0.3
30-39 40.6 0.8
40-49 32.1 1.6
50-59 24.2 4.8
60-69 17.0 13.6
70-79 11.0 24.2
80+ 5.8 47.8
Table 2: Quality-adjusted life expectation and QALE score by age class. Source: Love-
Koh et al. (2015), and own computation.
risk. The law of one price suggests that the social planner should use the
same system of values as the one used by the citizens to perform policy
evaluations. Murphy and Topel (2006) have calibrated an age-dependent
VSL function by using revealed preference studies to evaluate the social
benefit of improved life expectancies over the last century. Greenstone and
Nigam (2020) have used the age-specific life values of Murphy and Topel
to estimate the net benefit of the confinement strategy in the face of the
current pandemic. I report these RP values by age class in Table 3. The
value weight of the RP approach has an inverted-U shape, where the value of
life first slightly increases with age, peaks in the twenties, and then declines.5
As in the QALE approach, the reduction of the value vi = RPi with age
i is too small to compensate for the large growth rate of the mortality risk,
so that the RP score piRPi is increasing with age. Here again, the efficient
strategies is to expose people aged less than 65 years old.
3.4 Stated preference
In the context of mortality risk, the stated preference (SP) approach involves
asking members of a representative sample of the population at risk about
their WTP for a small hypothetical improvement in their survival probabil-
ity. In some studies, they are asked to take the role of the social planner in
5Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) also estimates an inverted-U shaped age-sensitive
VSL by using a life-cycle income and consumption model with a mortality risk. Their
VSL starts at 500,000 at age 20 to peak at 1,250,000 at age 40, and declines to 630,000
at age 60, in USD of 1978. Under this valuation system, protecting the seniors is optimal
too.
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Age class RP value (vi) RP score (pivi)
0-19 15.0 0.01
20-29 16.1 0.11
30-39 15.8 0.32
40-49 13.8 0.69
50-59 10.3 2.06
60-69 6.7 5.36
70-79 3.7 8.14
80+ 1.5 12.45
Table 3: Revealed preference life valuation and RP score by age class. Source: Green-
stone and Nigam (2020), and own computation.
determining the best choice in a set of options involving different number
of individuals of different ages facing an increased mortality risk. In the
covid context, Landier et al. (2020) confront respondents to two possible
allocations of ventilators, one for retirement homes in which 50,000 lives for
patients aged 70 years and older will be saved, and the other in hospitals
in which 30,000 lives for patients aged 30 years and older will be saved.
Twenty-eight percents of the respondents expressed a preference for saving
the larger number of patients in retirement homes. Carlsson, Daruvala and
Jaldell (2010) provide more information about the differential valuation of
life of different ages. In the context of car or fire casualties, they found that
avoiding the fatality of one 5-15-year-old person is equivalent to avoiding
1.4 fatalities of 35-45-year-old person, and to avoiding 3.3 fatalities of 65-
75-year-old person. A linear interpolation of this SP valuation system is
represented in Table 4.
Because the SP-score is increasing with age, the stated preference crite-
rion is also compatible with prioritizing the protection to the elders in spite
of their relatively lower stated value.
4 Discussion
The preliminary conclusion from the previous section is that whatever the
familiar moral principles to be used to perform the policy analysis, it is
optimal to protect the older generation from the exposure to the virus. This
is because the growth of the morality risk with age is so large that there
exists no reasonable valuation weights by age class that can reverse the
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Age class SP value (vi) SP score (pivi)
0-19 1 0.001
20-29 0.857 0.006
30-39 0.762 0.015
40-49 0.646 0.032
50-59 0.509 0.102
60-69 0.372 0.298
70-79 0.234 0.515
80+ 0.097 0.805
Table 4: Stated preference life valuation and SP score by age class. Source: Carlsson,
Daruvala and Jaldell (2010), and own computation.
intuition that the most vulnerable people must be protected. Their lower
life expectancy does not justify a choice reversal. In spite of this evidence,
most countries are contemplating a deconfinement strategy which is not
discriminated by age. It is thus useful to compare this observed policy with
the optimal strategy. I illustrate this for the case of France.
Suppose that herd immunity can be obtained with an immunity rate of
80%. The observed policy of a non-discriminated deconfinement implies that
all age classes will face a 80% rate of infection, implying in turn a death count
corresponding to their age-specific mortality rate.6 This is documented in
the second column of Table 5 and by the dashed curve in Figure 4. On
the contrary, given the demographic characteristics of France, the optimal
strategy consists in deconfining all people aged 65 and younger (in fact
100% of the 0-59 age class, and 55.47% of the 60-69 age class). Remember
that I assume that there is an acceptable confinement technology that fully
preserves from the virus, so that I assume no death among the elders. In
reality, the confinement will be imperfect, but I don’t take account of this
imperfection in my analysis. I also document fatalities by age class under
the optimal policy inn Table 5 and in Figure 4.
Attaining the herd immunity under total deconfinement will impose
446,792 deaths, mostly for people older than 60 years. This must be com-
pared to the death of 59,704 persons under the optimal age-specific decon-
finement strategy. The optimal policy would thus save 387,088 lives. Almost
6In reality, the social interaction matrix is not uniform, and old people have less inter-
action with others. This implies that their susceptibility ratio will asymptotically converge
to a larger ratio than for younger generations. I don’t take account of this dynamic effect
in this analysis.
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Age deaths in total deaths in optimal ∆ deaths QALE lost
class deconfinement deconfinement (in years)
0-19 129 161 32 2,026
20-29 418 523 105 5,147
30-39 1,326 1,658 332 13,445
40-49 3,434 4,292 858 27,542
50-59 14,056 17,570 3,514 85,115
60-69 51,197 35,500 -15,697 -266,511
70-79 100,208 0 -100,208 -1,103,033
80+ 276,023 0 -276,023 -1,590,290
Total 446,792 59,704 -387,088 -2,826,533
Table 5: Estimated death toll and loss in quality-adjusted life expectation by age class
for the total and optimal deconfinement.
3 million quality-adjusted life years would be saved under the optimal pol-
icy. In this study, I discriminate the deconfinement strategy only based
on age. But we know now that comorbidities have a large impact on the
mortality rate too. For example, in New York state, just over 86% of the
5,489 reported COVID-19 deaths before 6 April 2020 involved at least one
comorbidity, according to the state’s department of health.7 Adding some
of these comorbidities such as diabetes (37.3% of the New York deaths) and
obesity in the individual characteristics of the discriminated deconfinement
strategy could considerably reduce the death toll of this strategy, compared
to what is described in Figure 5.
The ethical issue is that the benefit of the optimal policy implies a trans-
fer of the mortality risk from the elders to the younger generations. For
example, 32 more individuals below the age of 20 years will die in France
under the optimal policy compared to the non-discriminated policy, but the
optimal policy will save 276,023 people aged 80 or more. But because the
utility loss from dying is larger for the young than for the old, the utilitar-
ian norm (Adler, 2019) favors this transfer only if this valuation difference is
not too large. A prioritarian norm gives even greater weight to individuals
with lower lifetime utility, but for reasonable parameter values explored by
Adler, Ferranna, Hammitt, and Treich (2019), it is unlikely to reverse the
policy recommendation. One position that could oppose the policy recom-
7https://www.the-hospitalist.org/hospitalist/article/220457/coronavirus-
updates/comorbidities-rule-new-yorks-covid-19-deaths
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mendation is the ”fair innings” argument introduced by Harris (1985, p.
91) : ”The fair innings argument requires that everyone be given an equal
chance to have a fair innings, to reach the appropriate threshold but, having
reached it, they have received their entitlement. The rest of their life is the
sort of bonus which may be canceled when this is necessary to help oth-
ers reach the threshold.” Taken literally, this argument, like the Rawlsian
maxmin criterion, implies a lexicographic priority for the young by rejecting
any transfer of mortality risk from old (who have reached their fair innings)
to young.
Does the discriminated deconfinement strategy require a restriction of
freedom? This pandemic entails an obvious externality issue, since the risky
behavior of some people affects the risk borne by others. Implementing a
pigouvian tax solution is not an operationally viable option. At the individ-
ual level, exiting the confinement has a cost and a benefit. The cost is the
increased mortality risk. The benefit is psychological, social and financial.
For the senior who should stay confined under the socially optimal strategy,
I believe that it would be individually rational for them to remain confined.
The deconfinement of the younger generations will generate a new wave of
infection – this is indeed the objective – that will transform the country into
a highly lethal environment for the seniors, for a period of 2 or 3 months. If
a person aged 80 exits confinement, her probability of being infected would
equal 80%, with a mortality rate of 8.3%. If her own VSL is 1 million euros,
her own valuation of this increased mortality risk is 66,400 euros. I believe
that her willingness to pay to eliminate the social and psychological stress
of the 3-month confinement is much smaller than that, thereby supporting
the rationality of the self-confinement of senior people. However, limited
rationality may be a problem here, in particular if it implies a surge in de-
mand for respirators. This could be countered by alleviating the burden of
the confinement. On-line networking could be boosted in retirement home,
together with ”happy hours” in shops. Free access could be offered to virus-
free spaces in theaters and concert halls, and in nice (currently empty) hotels
along our beaches for example. Some testing capacity could also be targeted
to visitors in retirement homes that are most closely related to their senior
guests.
What about the mortality risk borne by the younger generations? As I
write this paper, the impatience of a vast majority of the younger generations
is strong to exit from the containment. The risk that they will bear in the
period of herd immunity building can be borne on a voluntary basis.8 This
8Let’s for example consider a 30-year old person. Her covid mortality risk is 80% of
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limits the ethical issue of the proposed transfer of mortality risk. Moreover,
the additional mortality risk for the young is quite limited compared to
other health risks faced by this age class. For example, the proposed age-
specific deconfinement strategy examined in this paper generates 32 more
covid victims aged 20 or less. This should be compared to 500+ (562 in
2017) young people who die in car accidents every year in France.
Then, why do most States refuse to consider a discriminated deconfine-
ment strategy? People are often reluctant to play an active role in deci-
sions involving important moral issues. Moral psychologists have long been
studying when do people find it acceptable to sacrifice one life to save other
lives. Awad et al. (2020) have revisited the well-known ”trolley problem”
in which one must rank two scenarios. In the ”switch scenario”, a trolley
is about to kill five workers, but can be redirected to a different track, in
which case it will kill one worker. In the ”footbridge scenario”, a man can
be pushed in front of the trolley. This man will die, but his body will stop
the trolley before it can kill the five workers on the track. In this second
scenario, the decision-maker must take a more active and visible role in the
death of the victim by pushing him on the trolley track. In all cultures,
this footbridge scenario is considered as much less acceptable, probably for
that reason. Landier, Sastry, Sraer and Thesmar (2020) make a similar ob-
servation in the context of the current pandemic. When confronting survey
respondents to the question of whether to offer a single ICU to one of two
0.02%. Using a VSL of 3 million euros, her covid mortality cost is estimated at 480 euros,
which is likely to be much smaller than the social, psychological and financial benefit of
her deconfinement.
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sick persons, one with a larger chance of survival than the other, 37% of
the respondents prefer the rule consisting in allocating the ICU by using the
first-in-first-served rule. When exposing one age group of the population to
build the herd immunity in order to protect another age group, this decision
reallocates the mortality risk across individuals in a similar fashion than in
the ICU story. The reluctance to take active decisions aiming at reallocat-
ing mortality risk across different classes of citizens is an important bias in
collective decision making that one should address during this pandemic.9
It goes against the standard public decision-making rules used in normal
times in most western countries for at least 50 years. This bias may have
catastrophic consequences in the final death toll, as shown in Table 5.
5 Conclusion
Most governments are implementing a Plan A of deconfinement aimed at
obliterating the coronavirus. This requires maintaining the reproduction
number R low enough for a relatively long period of time. The economic cost
of this suppression strategy may be large, and its success probability may be
far from unity. In the absence of treatment or vaccine, there exists only one
possible Plan B, herd immunity. The problem of Plan B is the unbearable life
cost of the non-discriminated deconfinement strategy typically considered to
attain herd immunity. Under the assumptions of a 1% mortality rate and
of a herd immunity with an asymptotic 80% rate of immunity, one should
expect that 0.8% of the population will succumb.
However, this problem has a solution. It consists in building the herd
immunity with the categories of the population which are the least likely
to die if infected. Given the huge differences in mortality rates across age
classes, this herd immunity should be built by deconfining the younger gen-
erations first. This strategy implies an increased mortality risk for these less
vulnerable people, which is ethically questionable. However, because trans-
ferring the exposure from the old to the young reduces the death probability
by a factor 1000, moral concerns could reverse this recommendation only if
Society values one young life more than a thousand lives of people aged 65
years or more. This would go against several decades of policy evaluation
practice in which all lives are equally valued, or in which years of life lost
are counted. It also goes against observed individual preferences related to
9In decision theory, there exists an argument for people having a preference for reducing
the choice set based on regret aversion. Having no choice eliminates the risk of regret. See
for example Sarver (2008) and Gollier (2018).
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mortality risk, either revealed or stated.
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